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Introduction 
The global village that visionary writers such as Marshall 
McLuhan forecast may not be here, but the global marketplace 
surely is. Two basic statistical indicators can be cited. The first is 
that approximately one-half of all imports and exports are trans-
acted between companies and their foreign affiliates or parents. In 
the case of U.S. and European firms, the ratio varies from one-third 
to one-half. Almost three-fourths of Japan's total foreign trade is 
intercompany.! From the viewpoint of political geography these are 
international transactions. But from an economic and technological 
viewpoint, the flows of goods and services are internal transfers 
within the same organization. 
A second way of looking at the global marketplace is to consider 
that about one-half of the products manufactured in the United 
States have one or more foreign components. That also leads to dif-
ficult questions. Is Honda USA part of the Japanese business sys-
tem? Is IBM in Japan an American company? 
What makes the international economy so fascinating is the rapid 
rate of change. The forces of technology and economics are out-
pacing both current management thinking and traditional politics. 
The standard geopolitical map and the emerging technical/ eco-
nomic map are out of synchronization. In a way, this paper tries to 
bridge that gap. The events in Eastern and Western Europe-- both 
expected and unexpected -- reenforce the need to rethink conven-
tional business and government approaches. If there is any lesson 
from the past, it is the knowledge that in change there is both threat 
and opportunity. 
The good news is that the United States will surely be one of the 
three dominant economic powers far into the twenty-first century. 
The bad news is that this nation will have two tough competitors. 
One is the reinvigorated European Community (EC), where change 
is taking place on an unprecedented scale. The other is Japan and 
the Asian-rim countries adjacent to it whose economies are 
expanding more rapidly than are market opportunities for foreign-
ers. The Soviet Union-- still very much a military and political su-
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perpower -- is conspicuously absent from this list of economic su-
perpowers. One comparison is sufficiently telling: according to the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences, the USSR computer capacity equals 
that of Thailand -- less than one-thousandth of that of the United 
States.2 
The global marketplace is developing in an atmosphere of sub-
stantially reduced military and political tensions. The result is a 
smaller share of the spending pie going to defense in the United 
States in recent years. A similar shift in priorities is now beginning 
in the Soviet Union. Despite the difficult adjustments that will be 
faced by individual enterprises, their employees, and their commu-
nities, in the aggregate these are positive developments. They en-
courage people in each nation to look beyond their borders for new 
business potential. 
On the positive side, a rapid expansion of world markets is oc-
curring. In 1988, the volume of world trade increased by more than 
8 percent. Far more important for the future is that in 1989 the na-
tions of Eastern Europe began to abandon the closed communist 
economic system for the far more open Western trading community. 
Within Western Europe, trade and regulatory barriers are being 
dismantled among the twelve nations now members of the Euro-
pean Community as they move to an integrated economy by the end 
of 1992. 
The European Community 
The developments in Western Europe will have profound, long-
term effects on business productivity and international competitive-
ness. In effect, the EC is adopting the economic version of the 
American "driver's license rule." The results will be similar to that 
of our driver's license system where each state honors the license is-
sued by the other states no matter how great the variation in the 
rules of qualification. Thus the European Community is moving to 
a situation where what is permissible in one member nation is per-
mitted in each of the others.3 
The EC is reducing a host of restrictions on business, trade, and 
labor. People as well as goods and investments, will be able to move 
readily from any one of the twelve Common Market nations to an-
other. This will tend to make their industries more efficient as they 
achieve greater economies of scale and are subject more fully to 
competition from companies in the other EC countries. Not all of 
the developments overseas, however, will be positive in terms of 
their impacts on companies in the United States. 
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Negative Factors About EC '92 
Freedoms that will contribute to the integrated market of Europe 
may not be extended fully to American firms doing business in the 
EC, in part because of restrictions imposed by our own regulatory 
authorities. An example is "mutual recognition," meaning that each 
member of the EC recognizes the laws of the other members. Un-
der this concept, European banks whose home nation permits un-
derwriting and dealing in securities (i.e., investment banking) can 
provide that service in other member nations, even those that pre-
vent their own banks from doing so. As European banks begin to 
provide such services beyond the borders of their home countries, 
the more restrictive regulations of other member nations are likely 
to loosen. 
The biggest negative for U.S. firms is that 
the trade wall around the EC is not coming down. 
This regulatory convergence, however, could prove to be a com-
petitive stumbling block for many of the American banks in Europe. 
In the case of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks, our own Federal 
Reserve System prevents them from offering nonfinancial services 
"that could present undue financial risk or otherwise potentially 
harm the safety and soundness of the banking institution." As the 
Europe of the 1990s develops, the legal ability of large European 
banks to own nonfinancial companies and to provide more services 
than American banks could substantially reduce the competitiveness 
of U.S. financial institutions operating in Europe.4 
The biggest negative is that the trade wall around the EC is not 
coming down. If anything, a more inward-looking Community is 
toughening its barriers to external commerce. The 1985 White Pa-
per, which outlines the basic approach to the economic integration 
of the European Community, contains only a single sentence relat-
ing to the effects on relations with non-EC countries: 
In addition, the Community's trading identity must be strengthened, so 
that other trading partners will not be offered the benefits from the en-
larged Community market without themselves being forced to make con-
cessions.S 
The French Government, for example, has announced new reg-
ulations on TV programming (an important service export for the 
United States and one of the relatively few favorable items in our 
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balance of trade). In the guise of promoting EC-wide TV pro-
gramming, the French are limiting non-EC programming to 40 per-
cent of total air time. 6 
There is also the threat of new EC policies which would acceler-
ate mergers between European corporations. The prospect of cre-
ating very large corporations is scaring smaller firms in the Commu-
nity and may inhibit the rate of entry by medium-sized American 
firms into the European market. During 1989, a record 1,275 cross-
border mergers and acquisitions occurred in the EC. For Western 
Europe as a whole, the volume of cross-border mergers and acquisi-
tions in 1989 totaled 45 billion ECUs (European Currency Units), 
equivalent to $55 billion. This included the joining of Daimler-Benz 
and Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm to form the EC's largest indus-
trial combine.? 
A common fear among European business executives is 
that the larger, better capitalized U.S. finns will do better 
than they in selling to diverse continent-wide markets. 
Moreover, the European Community's external trade barriers 
are being strengthened by means of "domestic content" and 
"reciprocity" restrictions on imports. Ironically, those are precisely 
the restraints that Congress rejected in the late 1980s, in part be-
cause of the pleas of the EC that such measures were unfair and 
would provoke retaliation. Although our European friends assure 
us that these restrictive measures are aimed at the Japanese, we 
cannot be sure that their aim is that good. The same restrictions 
that keep out Japanese and other Asian-produced goods could also 
adversely affect U.S. exporters. At present, over half of the foreign 
trade of the twelve EC nations stays within the EC.B Moreover, if 
the access of the Asian-rim countries to European markets is lim-
ited, their major alternative will be North America. 
Challenges for American Companies 
Looking at Western Europe and out towards the completion of 
EC '92, there will be both winners and losers among American com-
panies. Many strong U.S. firms with an established presence in any 
one of the twelve member nations will do well. In fact, European 
businesses are afraid of competition now that their national markets 
will no longer be protected from outsiders. A common fear among 
European business executives is that the larger, better capitalized, 
higher tech U.S. firms will do better than they in selling to diverse 
continent-wide markets, where American companies have more ex-
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perience. In fact, there is widespread feeling that American firms 
already established in Europe are ahead of European companies in 
treating the EC as a single market. Examples frequently cited in-
clude General Motors, Ford, IBM, Digital Equipment and Unisys. 
That concern is underscored by the rapid increase in U.S. direct 
investment in Europe. Investments have grown by 30 percent over 
the past two years, to a current total of $130 billion. Major exam-
ples of this direct investment are the efforts by Citicorp and AT&T. 
To strengthen its presence in Europe's capital market, Citicorp has 
purchased the distressed Banco de Leveante in Spain, Banca Centro 
Sud in Italy, Banque Sud Beige in Belgium and the West German 
bank KKB. This enhanced presence in Western Europe may also 
provide Citicorp with the opportunity to finance some of the East-
ern European economies. 
AT&T recently beat out 20 other international telecommunica-
tion companies in acquiring the U.K. company Istel Ltd. With the 
acquisition of this global message service, AT&T has announced 
plans for expanding its electronic message switching services 
throughout Europe and into Asia. AT&T has also created a Euro-
pean alliance with the Italian telephone maker Italtel. This joint 
venture will help AT&T to meet the EC's domestic-content re-
quirements and thus permit its products to be sold in EC countries.9 
It is sad to note, however, that a recent survey of American com-
panies revealed that only 30 percent had established a strategic plan 
for a unified Europe. Less than half had even heard about EC '92.10 
For those U.S. firms who will be on the outside trying to look in, the 
results will not be very sanguine. They will encounter a variety of 
external barriers surrounding the European Community. 
Beyond 1992 
By the end of 1992, the economic integration of the present 
members of the European Community should be far advanced. Of 
the 300 actions sanctioned in a general way by the EC in 1987, about 
250 have been presented as formal proposals, and 130 of them have 
been adopted by the EC Council of Ministers. Thus far many of the 
measures that have passed are difficult, major items. For example, 
German and Italian regulations covering ingredients of beer and 
pasta, respectively, have been outlawed as policies which impede 
imports from other member countries that abide by the EC regula-
tions.ll 
Despite the substantial amount of progress being made toward 
full integration, each of the twelve countries likely will still retain its 
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own currency, its own tax system, and, of course, its ultimate 
sovereignty. Perhaps even more fundamental is the differing na-
tional traditions, especially the nine languages that are spoken in the 
Community.12 
Many European nations are knocking on the door of the Euro-
pean Community seeking admission. In the case of East Germany, 
the door seems to have been knocked down, as its economy is being 
integrated rapidly into that of West Germany. Other nations have 
been told to wait until 1993. In the past, it has taken six to eight 
years between the application for membership and actual admit-
tance. 
An economically united Europe could well 
becon1e the dominant economic power on the globe 
early in the twenty-first century. 
Austria is a logical candidate for entry into the EC. Although the 
Austrian economy is very modest-sized in relation to the EC as a 
whole, that move could turn out to be quite strategic. Hungary 
likely would be close behind. Not politically, but economically we 
would see a sort of revival of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire 
(which was a more viable economic unit than its now independent, 
constituent parts). Czechoslovakia and Poland might be next or at 
least might become "associate members," a status that could be ex-
tended to other Balkan nations, especially Turkey. 
Among the earliest candidates for entering an expanded EC may 
be the Scandinavian countries. With Denmark already a member, 
the pressure is on Norway to join. That in turn would increase the 
enticement to Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. Because of the tradi-
tional political neutrality of those countries, much would depend on 
further easing of military tensions and the changing role of NATO 
from a primarily military alliance to a political association. 
Although the member nations of the EC are expected to be 
working in harmony much of the time, each will continue to have 
individual values, cultures, and needs. Looking beyond the initial 
adjustment period, an economically united Europe could well be-
come the dominant economic power on the globe early in the 
twenty-first century if not sooner. As Stanley Hoffman, chairman of 
the Center for European Studies at Harvard, notes in his comment 
on the European Community: 
Clearly, the purpose of the whole effort is not merely to increase wealth 
by removing obstacles to production and technological progress, but also 
to increase Europe's power in a world in which economic and fmancial 
clout is as important as military might.13 
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Eastern Europe 
There is a great deal of pent-up consumer and industrial demand 
for American goods in the former "Iron Curtain" countries. Despite 
the enthusiasm of their citizens, the former Soviet satellites are only 
in the early stages of moving to a more capitalistic economy. The 
challenge to these countries is to convert. their inefficient national-
ized industries to competitive private enterprises. The consumers of 
those nations lack purchasing power, however, and their govern-
ments are already heavily indebted to the West. 
Generous supplies of equity capital from the United States and 
other Western nations will be required to create a modern, competi-
tive stock of factories and production equipment in Eastern Europe. 
But attracting foreign capital in substantial amounts will require 
dismantling the elaborate networks of controls established by their 
Marxist governments. 
Privatization of government-owned-and-operated firms will have 
to precede or at least accompany the establishment of a free market. 
Once ownership is private and individuals are able to cast their eco-
nomic votes through consumer demand, prices should move closer 
to their market-clearing levels. More realistic prices will create 
temporary hardships for consumers who have enjoyed the transitory 
benefits of price controls. But a true price system far more effec-
tively communicates the economic information which is needed to 
help direct foreign investment to the more profitable opportunities 
which, in turn, will help develop the Eastern European economies. 
In order to convert bureaucratic enterprises into true business 
firms, rank-and-file employees in Eastern Europe will have to shed 
the attitude, "They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work."14 
Workers will have to learn quickly what Americans have known for 
a long period of time: although the interests of management and 
labor may not always coincide in a capitalistic society, there is a ba-
sic relationship in a market economy between the productivity of 
workers on the job and the ability of the company to be a good em-
ployer. Productivity improvements are the catalyst for job longevity 
and the prospects for advancement in pay and fringe benefits. 
Eastern Europeans will encounter the economic forces that 
Americans and Western Europeans take for granted: under a free 
market system, factors of production will tend to move to those in-
dustries with the highest return. These industries will be the ones 
which produce goods that are disclosed by the price system to be 
more highly desired by consumers. The circle will then be complete. 
The greater availability of these desired commodities will enhance 
incentives for workers to increase productivity -- and hence their 
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purchasing power. Thus lifting price controls, although politically 
unpopular in the short run, starts a process that raises consumer liv-
ing standards in the longer run. 
This transition will not be an easy one. Four decades of commu-
nist rule have left the economies of the Eastern European nations in 
very poor shape. Poland, for example, experienced an inflation rate 
of 55 percent a month prior to its program of austerity. That hy-
perinflation resulted from a monetary policy so easy that govern-
ment enterprises paid negative real rates of interest (the interest 
rate was less than the inflation rate). 
A modest level of productivity would enable Eastern 
European finns to be c01npetitive in world markets while 
delivering improved living standards to their employees. 
Poland's budget deficit came to 30 percent of the entire budget, 
and 10 percent of the GNP. The Poles are now trying to eliminate 
the subsidies to nationalized industries and to various consumer 
groups at the same time that they have lifted price controls. The 
immediate result is that goods are available but few consumers can 
afford them. This situation is typical of the early stage of adjusting 
to a freer economy, with prices first rising sharply and, when exces-
sive inventories develop, often declining just as abruptly. 
While trying to end runaway inflation, Poland will be privatizing 
its inefficient nationalized enterprises and closing down or restruc-
turing an archaic industrial base. Eastern European enterprises are 
notoriously overstaffed because communist theology does not ac-
knowledge the presence of unemployment. One Polish steel com-
plex employs 30,000 workers to make the same amount of steel for 
which an American company uses 7,000 people. 
The Poles -- and Eastern European nations generally -- face a 
rough road ahead for the next several years. With their low labor 
costs, the Eastern European economies could be tough competitors, 
if they succeed in getting their acts together. In Poland, for exam-
ple, the average factory worker earns approximately $20 a week. 
A modest level of productivity would enable Eastern European 
firms to be competitive in world markets while delivering improved 
living standards to their employees. After a period of industrial re-
structuring, many of the enterprises could become suppliers and 
subcontractors to American and Western European businesses that 
are being pressed hard by Asian competitors. 
From the viewpoint of American investors, Eastern Europe pro-
vides intriguing combinations of high risk and high profits. The 
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overstaffed, inefficient nationalized enterprises are veritable gold 
mines of potential cost and profit enhancement. The longer term 
prospects are exciting. For example, the construction of adequate 
storage facilities in Gdansk might help make that city a major port 
of entry for all of Eastern Europe. 
More fundamentally, it would be a great achievement to demon-
strate to the world that the movement from capitalism to commu-
nism is not a one-way street. No nation has yet been successful in 
returning from communism to capitalism, but the prospects are 
brighter now than ever before for carrying out that change. 
Asian-Rim Countries 
Looking across the Pacific, our economic relations with Japan 
have been souring. Surely, there are shortcomings on both sides of 
the Pacific, and the Japanese have made some significant efforts to 
respond to American concerns. In 1985, Japanese exports to the 
United States were three times the amount of their imports of 
American goods and services. Since then, the rising yen and the 
growth in the Japanese economy have contributed to a substantial 
increase in the volume of Japan's imports. During the period 1985 
to 1988, overall Japanese merchandise imports rose by 40 percent; 
in the manufacturing sector, imports grew by 80 percent. This rising 
volume has benefited U.S. companies whose imports to Japan in-
creased by 100 percent during the same time period-- by more than 
120 percent in the case of U.S. producers of manufactured goods.15 
The expansion in U.S. exports to Japan has helped shrink the 
U.S. current account deficit with Japan from $40 billion dollars in 
1985 to $25 billion in 1988. Because each dollar of American ex-
ports to Japan is currently offset by three dollars of Japanese ex-
ports to us, the improvement in our trade balance has been modest 
(U.S. exports to Japan must rise three times as fast as imports just 
to keep the trade balance the same). 
Moreover, Japan's subsidies to its beef, rice, and telecommunica-
tions industries are examples of unfair trade policies which arouse 
American antipathy. Japan's cultural traditions and historical 
methods of doing business (notably a tightly controlled distribution 
system) have also contributed to the widespread belief that many of 
its domestic markets are virtually impenetrable to outsiders. These 
subtle and indirect forms of protectionism may help to explain why 
Japanese consumer goods are priced so much higher than compara-
ble American items. f6 
In the meantime, Japan and the other Asian-rim economies are 
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establishing their importance in the global and American 
economies. During the period 1980-1987, Asian imports of Ameri-
can-made goods increased at a rate of 25 percent, as compared to 20 
percent by European nations. However, the Asian economies sup-
plied 40 percent of all U.S. imports, nearly twice that supplied by all 
of Europe.17 
The Asian-rim nations could easily establish themselves as the 
most rapidly expanding marketplace for American goods and ser-
vices in the coming decade. Asia's population is expected to grow by 
about 240 million during the 1990s. This dramatic increase in labor-
force potential, coupled with Asia's advanced technology and work 
ethic, would also increase its productivity and insure greater con-
sumer purchasing power. 
After lots of intensive research, it seems that the magic formula 
used in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore consists 
of: 
• Going to school longer and studying harder. 
• Working harder and producing more. 
• Consuming less and saving more. 
• Investing in the next generation so that this process may be repeated. 
This is a formula the United States could follow without being sued 
for patent infringement. 
Companies in the United States might find very rough competi-
tion across the Atlantic Ocean -- in Europe --as well as across the 
Pacific, on the part of Japan and the other Asian-rim nations. All of 
these developments point up the need to strengthen the competitive 
position of American business here at home. 
Business Strategies for American Firms 
For the individual firm, there is substantial similarity between the 
domestic threats of losing corporate control via hostile takeover and 
the eroding of market position due to new foreign competition. In 
both cases, the firm has to review its strengths and weaknesses and 
to rethink its long-term strategy. Streamlining and restructuring can 
be effective responses to both sets of factors.18 As some firms are 
learning the hard way, a global economy does not necessarily mean 
that every company should try to cater to widespread foreign mar-
kets. It may mean that some should focus on specialty products and 
market niches where they have special advantages. 
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Truly fundamental changes are occurring in the very nature of 
business relationships. Joint ventures are no longer an obscure legal 
aspect of business, and strategic alliances are not just a theoretical 
possibility. 
AT&T is a good example of the emerging multinational firm, but 
it is hardly unique. The company was anxious to enter the semicon-
ductor business but did not have a broad enough product line to be 
a major factor. The answer for AT&T was to form a partnership 
with Japan's NEC Corporation. AT&T is trading some of its com-
puter-aided design technology for some of NEC's advanced logic 
chips. AT &T's foray into joint ventures does not end there. An-
other recent alliance provides access to design technology for mem-
ory chips from Mitsubishi Electric in exchange for making and mar-
keting the chips.19 
United Technologies' Otis Elevator is a current example of geo-
graphic diversification. In order to develop its customized Elevonic 
411 at the lowest possible cost, Otis Elevator utilized six research 
centers in five different countries. Otis' Farmington, Connecticut, 
group handled the systems integration, its unit in France perfected 
the door systems, the Spanish division handled the small-geared 
components, the German subsidiary was responsible for the elec-
tronics, and the Japanese segment designed the special motor 
drives. This internationalization of design and manufacturing saved 
more than $10 million in design costs and reduced the development 
cycle by half.20 
The automobile industry furnishes a fascinating example of the 
new global economy. Audi, a subdivision of Volkswagen, assembles 
some Porsches; VW in turn produces cars with Ford for the Brazil-
ian car market; Ford with the help of Nissan is currently designing a 
new minivan; Nissan, in addition, owns 5 percent of Subaru's pro-
ducer, Fuji Heavy Industries; Subaru and Isuzu jointly produce cars 
in America; and finally, 40 percent of Isuzu is owned by GM, which 
also owns 5 percent of Suzuki.21 (See Figure 1 for the various au-
tomobile company relationships.) 
IBM is often cited as the role model for foreign firms focusing on 
high technology markets. Potential imitators note that the corpora-
tion's basic research laboratories are in Switzerland and Japan, as 
well as the United States. Its 30-odd research divisions are located 
around the world. Thus, the process of international technology 
transfer at IBM is often internal to the firm. Xerox Corporation is 
another interesting example of global production. Xerox has intro-
duced some 80 different office copying machines in the United 
States that were engineered and built by its Japanese joint venture, 
Fuji Xerox Company.22 
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Several key actions or capabilities tend to characterize the 
American business firms that perform well in international mar-
kets:23 
• They translate a domestic strategic advantage overseas by getting close to 
their customers and adapting that strategy to the local markets. For 
example, Pall Filters, the major U.S. producer of wine filters, 
succeeded in selling to the snobbish French wine makers. It 
completely redesigned its filters, coming up with a French version. 
The company succeeded in penetrating the Italian wine market by 
designing a third type of filter. 
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• They do not set up large intemational bureaucracies. The cost of the 
international staff rarely exceeds 1 percent of sales. Most overseas 
operations are run by foreign nationals who best understand the local 
markets. CEOs of successful foreign subsidiaries are more likely to be 
hands-on managers than financial or legal executives. 
• They stan their foreign operations when the overall companies are still of 
a moderate size. This is in sharp contrast to the widespread notion 
that only giant firms such as IBM can succeed in selling abroad. To 
do well in the United States no longer suffices in penetrating new 
overseas markets. Many foreign economies are growing faster than 
our home markets. Most of the successful foreign operations tend to 
be profitable by their second year (contrary to the notion of a long 
build-up period being necessary). 
• They encourage foreign subsidiaries to make innovations which, in tum, 
can also be used in the United States. For example, Dunkin' Donuts 
established its reputation in the United States by always having fresh 
donuts and coffee prepared on the premises. In Tokyo and Manila, 
space for cooking was not available on an economical basis. The 
company responded by devising a way of preparing the donuts and 
coffee on the trucks bringing in supplies. This method was so 
successful that it is now used in the United States. 
Globally oriented executives with the marketing knowledge of 
many regions and their respective needs are gradually replacing the 
traditional managers oriented to a single location. This change also 
requires the development of products that can be regionally modi-
fied for different marketing methods and customer needs. Concur-
rently, corporations are emerging that can produce at levels which 
will yield global economies of scale. These firms will also be able to 
manufacture and distribute with regard to the different local re-
quirements of the consumers in the European market. The levels of 
risk of the global firm are likely to be relatively lower than that of 
local companies -- with many benefits as well. For example, the di-
versification should justify higher and more advanced levels of 
R&D. 
Implications for Public Policy 
The current battles over trade protectionism and foreign invest-
ment restrictions are only the most obvious manifestations of the 
rising tension between domestic political forces and transnational 
economic forces. The private enterprise is increasingly global in its 
scope of activity. It is not just a matter of selling abroad, but of en-
gaging overseas in such basic corporate functions as purchasing, fi-
nancing, research and development, and production. 
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Government policy, in the United States and elsewhere, is 
changing. However, it is a matter of playing "catch up ball," lagging 
behind both technological advances and economic pressures. The 
tension itself is nothing new. It has traditionally existed between 
private enterprises and the rulers of developing countries (see Table 
1 for details). The tension between governments generally and the 
business firm is being exacerbated by the rapid rate of economic, so-
cial, and technological change. 
Fortunately, there is another force involved that ultimately car-
ries the day -- the citizen-voter-consumer. Voters still care very 
much about investments, production, and jobs in their country and 
state and locality. And politicians react to that relationship while 
companies take advantage of it. But there is a rapidly growing and 
far more positive aspect: consumers vote every day of the week 
with their dollars, yen, deutschmarks, pounds, francs, and lire. They 
think more about price and quality than country of origin. They go 
to movies produced in many nations. They watch television per-
formers from almost every part of the globe. And they increasingly 
travel to and communicate with people around the world. Without 
thinking about it too deeply, most consumers are adapting to the 
global economy much faster than is the political process. 
There is a useful role for government in dealing with the global 
marketplace and it is well known: Enhance the productivity and 
competitiveness of American business by reducing tax and regula-
tory burdens and lowering the real cost of capital in the United 
States by curbing deficit financing. 
Also, antitrust laws need to be updated. It took decades for the 
Justice Department to acknowledge the role of imports in the do-
mestic marketplace. Yet the "relevant market" (a key concept in an-
titrust enforcement) often now extends beyond the borders of the 
United States. Likewise, the geographic restrictions on American 
banks, limiting them to a single state or region, prevents them from 
attaining the economies of scale and market positions that would 
match the now dominant power of Asian and European financial in-
stitutions. 
A challenging task of economic education faces the United States 
today in helping citizens (consumers/taxpayers) to understand the 
increasingly global nature of economic life. True, it is easier to see 
the impact of foreign money in the United States than it is to visu-
alize the role of American investment in other nations. Yet the ef-
fects flow in both directions. 
A quarter of a century ago, the citizens of Western Europe were 
complaining about making the world one big Coca-Cola franchise. 
The "American challenge" was a popular topic for public debates 
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Table 1 
TENSIONS BETWEEN DEVELOPING-COUNTRY GOALS 
AND BUSINESS ACTMTIES 
Developing Countries 
Promote local ownership 
Increase local control 
Change payment characteristics and 
reduce duration of contracts 
Minimize source firm's control over 
use of technology and capital in 
user nation 
Separate technology from normal 
private investments 
Remove restrictive business clauses 
in investment and technology 
agreements 
Minimize proprietary rights 
of suppliers 
Reduce contract security 
Encourage transfer of R&D to host 
country 
Develop products suitable for 
domestic markets 
International Private Enterprises 
Maintain global standards and 
efficiency 
Minimize cost and complexity of 
delivering technology and capital 
Receive just returns for risks 
Gain assurance regarding 
property rights over use of 
private resources 
Provide technology as part of 
long-term production and 
market development 
Maintain ability to affect the 
use of capital, technology and 
associated products 
Protect right to profit from 
private investments 
Use contracts to create an 
environment of stability 
and trust 
Maintain control of R&D 
paid for by company 
Gain global economies of 
scale to lower cost of 
products to consumers 
Source: Adapted from the President's Task Force on International Private Enter-
prise, The Private Ente1prise Guidebook (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1984). 
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overseas. This nation's reply was that U.S. investment benefited 
foreigners by creating employment, income and tax collections in 
their countries. But now the shoe is on the other foot. Neverthe-
less, the results are very similar. Foreign investment is creating jobs, 
income, and tax revenue in this country. With the financing of our 
outsized budget deficits draining off so much of our domestic sav-
ings, that foreign money is a key factor in the continued prosperity 
of the United States. 
Foreign investment is creating jobs, income, 
and tax revenue and is a key factor in the 
continued prosperity of the United States. 
In a positive way, public policy should focus on the government's 
area of primary responsibility: the education of the future Ameri-
can work force. In the international economy in which the next gen-
eration of Americans will be competing, it is sad to report that, 
compared to most other industrial nations, our students know less 
biology, chemistry and math, understand little of foreign cultures, 
and rarely speak or read foreign languages. 
The low literacy rates and high drop-out rates cannot be blamed 
on foreigners. Dealing with domestic educational shortcomings is 
the unique responsibility of Americans. A well-educated citizenry is 
vital to the future of a democracy; it is also the key to achieving 
greater productivity and global competitiveness. 
A final note: Here at home, we are so conscious of our limita-
tions -- budget deficits, trade deficits, and the serious social prob-
lems facing our young people. Pessimism clouds America's view of 
the relative strength of the domestic economy and causes many to 
feel that the United States has lost its position as the economic su-
perpower. In fact, the average American can still make in thirty 
minutes what it takes the Japanese an hour to produce. The pur-
chasing power of the average American is approximately 7 percent 
higher than that of the next wealthiest country (on a per capita ba-
sis), which happens to be the Canadians-- not the Japanese.24 
There is nothing like a trip overseas to remind Americans that 
the United States must be doing something right. So much of the 
communist and socialist worlds are moving towards freedom and the 
competitive marketplace in which private enterprise can flourish. 
The model they have in mind is the United States. In any event, the 
United States remains the only nation that is simultaneously a mili-
tary and an economic superpower. 
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